University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiSur

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

9-1-1995

Analysis: Is Neoliberalism Undermining
Alternative Project for Nicaragua?
Guest Author

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur
Recommended Citation
Guest Author. "Analysis: Is Neoliberalism Undermining Alternative Project for Nicaragua?." (1995).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/12009

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 55959
ISSN: 1060-4189

Analysis: Is Neoliberalism Undermining Alternative Project
for Nicaragua?
by Guest
Category/Department: Nicaragua
Published: 1995-09-01
By William Robinson
[The author teaches sociology at the University of New Mexico and is Research Associate at the
Center for International Studies in Managua. He is LADB's former news analyst. His latest book,
"Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization and U.S. Intervention, Hegemony and Democracy in the 21st
Century," will be published in 1996 by Cambridge University Press.]
Five years after its surrender of government to a US-assembled coalition of the traditional
Nicaraguan elite, the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) has been unable to recover
from the crippling crisis following its 1990 electoral defeat. The defeat plunged the Sandinista
party, its social base and legitimacy already seriously eroded during the long years of the US war,
into a sharp internal crisis over programs, ideological orientation, and strategy. Tactical, strategic,
and ideological differences in the once- powerful party regarding how to sustain a broad-based
alternative for Nicaragua in the age of global capitalism and the retreat from revolution finally
led to an open split earlier this year, leaving the party's future uncertain. In February, former vice
president and renowned novelist Sergio Ramirez, legendary guerrilla commander Dora Maria
Tellez, National Directorate member Luis Carrion, and other prominent Sandinista leaders broke off
and formed the Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS).
Leadership of the FSLN has stayed with party general secretary and former Nicaraguan president
Daniel Ortega. New elections are scheduled for November 1996, but prospects for the FSLN
returning to office through the ballot are dim. In the immediate aftermath of its electoral defeat, the
FSLN stayed united and was still the largest and best- organized political force in the country. Much
of the population remained politicized and mobilized in the old mass organizations, and even more
so, in new autonomous social movements that flourished after the elections. Following Chamorro's
April 1990 inauguration, the new government announced a sweeping neoliberal program, including
massive layoffs, privatizations, sharp reductions in social spending, and the elimination of subsidies
on basic consumer goods.
The measures triggered two national strikes, both of which paralyzed the country and demonstrated
the working class's willingness and ability to mount resistance under FSLN leadership. This
resistance forced the new government to implement its economic program gradually, through a
strategy of "slow- motion counterrevolution." Nicaragua entered a period of endemic social conflict.
Cycles of standoff, negotiation, and compromise alternated with peaceful and violent strikes,
demonstrations, and clashes in the countryside and the cities, and occurred against the backdrop
of ongoing political realignments and a "creeping" implementation of the counterrevolutionary
program.
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Over the years, international financial agencies, the US government, and the traditional Nicaraguan
elite have been effective in utilizing the power that transnational capital wields over the wartorn and economically shattered country. This power and the enormous constraints that the
global economy imposes, along with the disorientation of the FSLN and grassroots organizations,
permitted the elites to dismantle the 1979-1990 revolution, restructure every aspect of Nicaraguan
society, and reconstitute a propertied class and a political elite tied to international capitalism. The
initial optimism that the poor majority would be able to "govern from below" and preserve the gains
of the revolution gave way to massive disillusionment and demobilization. Inside the FSLN, fierce
debates ensued about a viable alternative program for Nicaragua and the tactics and strategy to
achieve it. Attempting to undertake the transformation from guerrilla clandestinity to state power
and then to a legal opposition party operating within the legitimizing parameters of "low-intensity
democracy" proved difficult.
The FSLN's inability to articulate a coherent alternative to the policy of neoliberalism and
Nicaragua's insertion into global capitalism meant political vulnerability, lack of definition,
and incoherence in its own conduct. All Sandinistas seemed to agree that the FSLN had to be
transformed from a "revolutionary vanguard" into a modern political movement able to compete
in the formal political arena, including in elections, while also mobilizing and leading the country's
poor majority. Despite widespread recognition of the need for internal renovation, in practice the
FSLN remained lethargic and resistant to change.
The international press characterized the FSLN crisis and the split as a fight between "orthodox"
hard-liners under Ortega's leadership and "moderate" social democrats led by Ramirez. In
reality, the split is considerably more complex. It is rooted in different analyses of why the Central
American revolutions ultimately failed and what options are available for the left and the poor
majority in the "new world order." Many left and grassroots leaders in Central America and political
allies and sympathetic academics outside the region concluded that the revolutionary projects had
run up against a regional stalemate. According to this analysis, the old oligarchies had virtually
disappeared, replaced by two ascendant forces: a "modernized" technocratic New Right under
US leadership and tied to transnational capital; and the poor and dispossessed who had become
political protagonists and contenders for power in the 1980s.
Neither of these two new contenders could prevail, went the analysis, and so the stalemate in the
region created the conditions for a historic compromise between different class and social forces
who favored mutual accommodation. This opportunity for a modus vivendi, to be achieved through
negotiations, peace settlements, and elections, would shift the struggle from the military to the
political-civic arena through regionwide democratization and demilitarization processes. The logical
strategy developed on the basis of this analysis was for poor and working classes and the left to
compete with new "democratic" adversaries through elections and peaceful mobilization.
The most important goal under this strategy would be to safeguard the "democratic structures" that
had been achieved through the revolutionary upheaval. Structural transformations in favor of the
poor majority were seen as not only possible, but necessary for consolidating peace and stability.
Therefore such changes would be supported by reconfigured dominant groups and even by the
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US. But as armed insurgencies gave way to negotiations and elections, one side the New Right and
transnational capital consolidated its power, achieved dominance, and set about implementing its
project of neoliberalism, low-intensity democracy, and ideological hegemony.
The other side the left and grassroots movements already exhausted and weakened by a decade
of counterinsurgency and counterrevolution, went on the defensive and fell into a quagmire. In
retrospect, it was clear that what took place in the 1977-1991 period was not a regional stalemate
and historic compromise but the conditional defeat of the broad-based sectors and the conditional
victory of the old and new dominant groups. It was a conditional defeat because the poor majority
did not go down in total defeat. They still have active and reserve forces, an organizational capacity,
and a culture of resistance that the adversary has not been able to exorcise. It was a conditional
victory because the dominant groups did not win a total victory and get what they wanted: a pacified
and pliant population of 20 million poor Central Americans willing to quietly work to death or
silently resign themselves to marginalization and degradation.
With this as the backdrop, the Sandinistas mapped out a contradictory and inconsistent strategy in
the early 1990s. At times they provided critical support to the government in the name of national
stability, post-war reconstruction, and an ill-defined "national project" that would coalesce the
left and center around defense of formal democratic structures and the social changes affected
during the revolution. At other times, they opposed the government by organizing strikes and mass
protests against its rigid neoliberal measures. The first track conditional support for the government
under the erroneous assumption that it would meet the FSLN half-way, compromise over policy,
and preserve some of the revolution's gains achieved little more than a further erosion of the FSLN's
authority among its base of support. The second track leading constant protests went nowhere
because the Sandinistas were unable to provide an alternative program or decisive leadership,
thus they gradually wore down the strength and stamina of grassroots protest and of Sandinista
credibility.
The dead end of this see-saw strategy eventually led to fissures within the FSLN. Debate divided
the party into two camps. One called at the tactical level for mass, grassroots mobilizations as the
principal form of struggle, and for a total rejection of the neoliberal project. The other argued for
rigorous defense of formal democratic procedures and the rule of law, which meant that struggles
should take place in the parliament, through elections, and through political compromise rather
than through mass mobilization and an outright rejection of neoliberalism. The fissures were
aggravated by a pernicious opportunism among many Sandinista leaders, for whom defending
the FSLN's institutional clout and organizational resources constituted their own source of power,
authority, privilege, and material comfort, and took priority over their commitment to a grassroots
project. A tenacious "vanguardism" blocked authentic internal party democratization.
Sandinistas and their supporters hoped that the party would be renewed and an organic unity
achieved in the first FSLN congress in 1991. But this congress only covered up tensions in the name
of maintaining party unity during a difficult transition period. These tensions increased in 1992 and
1993. The party held together in the hope that a real renewal would come in the extraordinary 1994
Congress, but the schisms only deepened. Rather than a democratization of the party's structures,
the Ortega faction effectively purged its opponents from leadership positions. Following the
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congress, this faction gained control of party assets and went on a virtual witch hunt, attacking
opponents and expelling them from the party's organs and media outlets. The purge included
dismissing Carlos Fernando Chamorro, long-time editor of the Sandinista-owned daily newspaper
Barricada. Resignations from the party were forthcoming, including those of poet and former
minister of culture Ernesto Cardenal and his brother, Fernando, the former education minister who
had led the world-famous 1980 literacy crusade.
"The 'orthodox' sector has waged a dirty war against anyone who has a different idea of what
Sandinismo means and how Sandinistas should act in the current situation," argued Tellez, in
explaining the reasons for her resignation. In its founding statement, the MRS declared: "We fought
to renovate Sandinismo from within the organizations we belonged to, confident that we would be
able to do so while maintaining unity and mutual respect. However, the majority of the members
of the democratic left promoted divisionist policies, crushing and excluding their opposition and
setting the FSLN on the path to moral and political annihilation." The "democratic left" tendency,
as the Ortega faction calls itself, has been unable, or unwilling, to look beyond the 1979-1990 years,
and still dreams that it will sweep back into power in next year's elections, like some revolutionary
Camelot of a bygone era.
In reality, the FSLN leadership is not democratic, has not shed the old top-down vanguardist
tendencies, and has not found a formula for directing spontaneous and localized struggles toward
attainable goals and realistic demands. In May, it promulgated an electoral platform that is
highly critical of the government and its neoliberal program and it confidently declared that
the Sandinistas will win the 1996 vote, but offered little in the way of a concrete programmatic
alternative. The MRS also declared confidently that it would win the elections.
But expectations that the new group would be able to win the support of, and rekindle political
enthusiasm among, the estimated 350,000 inactive Sandinistas simply did not materialize. The new
group has remained, for the most part, a club of leaders distanced from the grassroots. And both
groups have their share of opportunists and elites property owners and businesspeople who fall
within the "plenty" side of the post-1990 "poverty amid plenty" landscape who seemingly share
more with the wealthy in outlook and conduct than with the poor majority. The FSLN and the MRS
retain support among the revolutionary generation of the 1970s and 1980s and also among leaders
and members of the scattered grassroots organizations, not because either has put forward a viable
project, but because they are opposed to neoliberalism, call for alternatives, and retain the mantle
of Sandinismo, which remains a national patrimony of the poor and working classes. Neither has
ruled out electoral and other alliances. And there are Sandinista leaders such as Henry Ruiz, a 30year veteran highly respected by all factions who have been striving to bring the two together and
provide leadership for the disoriented base.
Neoliberalism has thrown most Nicaraguans into a desperate social and economic situation,
too preoccupied with the struggle for daily survival to remain politically active. It has effectively
deactivated the mass social movements, excluded and atomized the grassroots by dragging
its members into extreme poverty and despair. Spontaneous outbreaks of individual violence,
pandemics of street crime, prostitution, social atomization, and drug addiction has unravelled the
social fabric and replaced the sense of collective fate and solidarity that characterized the revolution
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with a disturbing social anomie and political apathy, especially among the generation that came of
age during or after the revolution.
The Sandinistas face the same questions as does the Latin American left in general in the "new
world order": What type of project is viable and realistic, especially for a small, peripheral nation,
given global forces that are too powerful to confront head on, the impossibility of withdrawal from
the international system, and well-known limits to social change in any one country?

-- End --
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